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I INTRODUCTION 
In 2006 Goddard J handed down her decision in Goulden v Wellington City 
Council, 1 a judicial review case brought by Wellington City Councillor Robin Goulden 
following his censure for breaching the Councils Code of Conduct. Goddard J found in 
favour of the Council and upheld the censure, an impo11ant decision for local councils as 
it affinned the importance of their Codes of Conduct. However the decision did not 
adequately address the role that the New Zealand Bill of Rights 1990 (NZBORA) plays 
in judicial review proceedings. This paper will critique Goddard Js treatment of the role 
of the NZBORA in Goulden2 by highlighting the developments in the illegality and 
unreasonableness heads ofreview. The developments under the illegality head ofreview 
will be analysed and the relevant case law will be applied and the advancements in the 
unreasonableness head ofreview will be considered including an assessment of the 
emerging doct1ine of proportionality. These developments will be compared with 
Goddard Js approach to outline the approp1iate use of the NZBORA in the Goulden3 case. 
II FACTS OF THE CASE 
On 20 September 2004 Goulden made a statement to the Cook Strait News in an 
a11icle profiling him as one of the nominated mayoral candidates in the 2004 local 
government elections. The ai1icle outlined that he was standing on a platform of 
controlling city debt, greater public consultation and a fairer distribution of Council 
spending across the city. He went on to state:4 
There's a lot of confusion in the co mmunity about the level of debt. ... The figures seem 
wrong. KeJTy Prendergast and financial officer Andrew McKenz ie have now produced a different 
set of fi gures, which puts debt at cuJTently $70 millio n, with another $55 million appro ved in the 
Annual Plan . But the public is co ncerned about the debt, which is planned to hit $360 million or 
1 Goulden v Welling ton City CounCJl [2006] 3 Z LR 244, (HC) Goddard J. 
2 Ibid . 
3 Ibid. 
4 "Rob Goulden for Mayor and Counci1 "(20 September 2004) Cook Strait News. 
3 
$390 million by 2013. The public is also concerned about wasteful spending like on the stock 
exchange sign; it's reckless. 
The issue of Council debt had been an ongoing and topical subject in the months 
leading up to the article. In March 2004 a Wellington resident had w1itten to a local paper 
expressing his concern over the city debt figures and fmther discussion was generated in 
the media by Councillors about the Councils debt levels in June and July of2004. 5 
Following the release of the 2003/2004 Annual Report in August Goulden highlighted at 
a council meeting that the numbers in the report were different to those in the annual 
plan, and it was explained to him that the difference was centred on different financial 
years, budget figures as opposed to actual figures and gross debt as opposed to net debt.6 
Goulden was not satisfied with this explanation of the inconsistent debt figures and this 
lead to the content in the Cook Strait News mticle at issue. 
Following the Cook Strait News mticle Councillor Alick Shaw wrote to the 
Mayor alleging that Goulden had breached the Councils Code of Conduct in two respects; 
firstly Goulden's behaviour at a Finance and Corporate meeting which was an issue that 
was later dropped and will not be discussed fu1ther, and secondly Goulden 's Cook Strait 
News election adveitisement. 7 Councillor Shaw claimed that the public statements made 
by Goulden in respect of debt were clem· breaches of two provisions in the Wellington 
City Councils Code of Conduct.8 Firstly the code states that councillors may not do 
anything which compromises or could be seen as compromising the impmtiality of an 
employee and secondly councillors should avoid publicly c1iticising any employee in any 
way, but especially in ways that reflect on the competence and integrity of the employee.9 
Shaw believed Goulden should have repo1ted his issues regarding Mr McKenzie's 
integ1ity, impa1tiality and competence in respect of his representation of the Councils 
debt position to the Chief Executive and that his failure to do so was an 'utterly 
5 Chronology prepared by Counsel for Goulden and Counsel for Wellington City Council. 
6 Chronology prepared by Counsel for Goulden and Counsel for Wellington City Council ;Goulden v 
Wellington City Coun cil, above n I , para 7, (HC) Goddard J. 
7 Deputy Mayor Alick Shaws letter to Mayor Kerry Prendergast (30 September 2004) 
8 Ibid 
9 Wellington City Council Code of Conduct, 11 . 
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reprehensible and extremely serious breach of his obligations under the code and that it 
has brought the council into disrepute.' 10 
This complaint initiated a lengthy process of communication between the Mayor, 
the Chief Executive and Councillor Goulden on how the complaint was to be dealt with 
which resulted in an extraordinary meeting being called to hear the complaint and the 
recommendation for Goulden 's censure on 15 December 2004. 11 At the extraordina1y 
meeting the Council resolved that Goulden's comments in the Cook Strait News a11icle 
had breached the Councils Codes of Conduct and that the approp1iate response to the 
breach was to censure the Councillor. 12 
Goulden brought judicial review proceedings against the Council in which he 
made arguments about va1ious breaches of natural justice and the councils absence of 
jurisdiction that were unsuccessful, however they do not fo1m the focus of this paper. 
Goulden also argued that under section 14 of the NZBORA he had the right to freedom of 
expression however this argument did not form an integral pai1 of his submissions as the 
natural justice issues took a much larger focus. 13 As a result of this Goddard J dealt with 
the NZBORA, in particular section 14, very briefly and chose not to deal with it under the 
illegality, procedural unfairness or unreasonableness heads ofreview. Her Honour held 
that Goulden's right to freely express his opinion was subject to the limitation in the 
codes of conduct that media comments must observe the other rules in the code. 14 Her 
Honour also held that the limits placed on freedom of expression by the code of conduct 
are a justified and reasonable limit. 15 In my view this treatment of the NZBORA falls 
incredibly sho11 of what is required under the NZBORA, as a NZBORA analysis should 
have been considered in much more detail under the illegality and w1reasonableness 
10 Deputy Mayor Alick Shaws letter to Mayor Keny Prendergast (30 September 2004). 
11 Goulden v Wellington City Counal, above n 1, 248-252 (HC) Goddard J; Chronology prepared by Counsel 
for Goulden and Counsel for Wellington City Cow1cil; Submissions of Counsel for Applicant in Goulden v 
Wellington City CounaJCN 2005/ 485/ 001, 13-15. 
12 Minutes of the Wellington City Council Extraordinary Meeting (15 December 2004); Goulden v Wellington 
City Council, above n 1, 252-253 (HC) Goddard J. 
13 Submissions of Counsel for the Applicant in Goulden v Wellington City Council CIV 2005 /485 /001 , 13 , 16-22; 
Goulden v Wellington City Council, above n 1, para 32-35 (HC) Goddard J. 
14 Goulden v Wellington City Council, above n 1, para 73 (HC) Goddard J. 
15 Ibid 
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heads ofreview. Goddard J did not address the NZBORA under either of these heads of 
review. Instead her Honour focussed on issues of ju1isdiction under the illegality head of 
review, and applying the strict Wednesbury unreasonable test under the unreasonableness 
head ofreview which does not take into consideration competing human rights 
interests. 16 I will address the areas in which the NZBORA affects judicial review and out 
line the appropriate use of the NZBORA in this case. 
Codes of Conduct-An Overview 
Under Schedule 7 clause 15(1) of the Local Government Act 2002 [LGA], a local 
authority must adopt a code of conduct for members of the local autho1ity as soon as 
practicable after the commencement of the LGA. 17 Codes of conduct for local authorities 
were previously not in existence in New Zealand before the LGA, however they have 
been part of the local autho1ity obligations in the United Kingdom for some time. 18 The 
LGA stipulates that the first code should be adopted by resolution but a subsequent 
amendment requires a vote of not less than 75 percent of the members present.
19 The 
code governs elected members relationships with other members, council staff and the 
public.20 Therefore it does not operate solely in the political arena.2 1 Schedule 7 Clause 
15(2) of the LGA outlines that a code of conduct must set out: 2
2 
a) Understandings and expectations adopted by the local autho,ity about the manner in 
which members may conduct themselves while acting in their capacity as members, 
including-
(i) Behaviour toward one another, staff, and the public 
16 Goulden v Wellington City Council , above n 1, para 36-49 , 59-61 (HC) Goddard J. 
17 Local Government Act 2002 , Schedule 7 ,Clause 15(1 ). 
18 
Brookers Online Commentary 
http: / / www.brookersonline.co.nz.helicon .vuw.ac.nz / databases / modus/ lawpart / statutes/ ACT- ZL-PUB-
Y.200284-END-SCHG-SCH.7-PT.1-CLG.!221-CL.15?sid=uklrtxsrvjncxlch5xephan072ml4wc4&hli=4&sp 
=statutes&si=57359(last accessed 28 August 2007). 
19 Local Government Act 2002 , Schedule 7, Clause 15(6) . 
20 Ibid, Schedule 7 Clause I 5(2)(a)(i). 
21 Office of Controller and Auditor General, local Authority Codes of Conduct, (2006) 13. 
22 Local Government Act 2002 Schedule 7, Clau e 15(1 ). 
6 
The councillors are bound by the LGA but the Act does not specify the 
consequences of breaching the codes of conduct, and a breach of the code does not 
constitute an offence under the Act.23 Instead this is left up to the individual councils to 
outline when they create their code. Each council has considerable discretion in how it 
designs and uses these codes for example it can be simply used as a statement of 
aspiration similar to a mission statement, or an infonnal rule book and some councils 
have chosen not to provide for any enforcement of their code.24 
Wellington City Councils Code of Conduct 
On 1 October 2003 Wellington City Council adopted their code of conduct. The 
code set out standards of behaviour expected from individual elected members in the 
exercise of their duties. It aims to promote effective local governance by helping elected 
members establish and maintain working relationships based on trust and respect.25 
The Wellington City Council Code of Conduct states that elected members have to 
conduct their dealings with each other in ways that are open and honest, that uphold the 
credibility and public confidence of their office, and that avoid aggressive, offensive or 
abusive conduct. Councillors have to also maintain the level or cooperation and respect 
between themselves and staff members by acting respectfully towards staff and 
recognising that the Chief Executive is responsible for the employment of staff They 
must be aware of the obligations the council has to its staff. 26 At issue in Goulden27 is the 
provision that advocates that Councillors must not do anything that compromises the 
impai1iality of an employee and that they must ' avoid publicly criticising any employee 
in any way, but especially in ways that reflect on the competence and integrity of the 
employee. '28 Councillors can only raise concerns about employees directly with the Chief 
Executive.29 These provisions are in place to enforce the Council's obligations to act as a 
23 Ibid , Schedule 7 , Clause 15(7)(4 ). 
24 
Office of Controller and Auditor Gen eral , Local Authority Codes of Conduct, (2006) 5-8. 
25 Wellington City Council Code of Conduct, 5. 
26 Ibid , 11. 
27 Goulden v Wellington City Coun cil, above n I (HC) Goddard J. 
28 Wellington City Council Code of Conduct, 11 . 
29 Ibid , 11 . 
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good employer so that they are not exposed to civil litigation or audit sanctions.30 The 
code also states that councillors are free to express a personal view in the media, at any 
time, however any media comments must observe the other requirements of the code. 31 
Members of the Wellington City Council are required under the LGA to comply 
with the Code of Conduct.32 If the code is breached the Mayor and the CEO consider 
each allegation and if the alleged breach is serious enough the Mayor will refer the matter 
to council. The council will decide if a breach has occun-ed and what consequences for 
the Councillor should aiise, such as censure.33 Censure involves the council expressing 
disapproval or condemnation of a councillor, and this is the sanction Goulden received.34 
It is not a statutory concept but is based on practise and standing orders.35 
III APPLICATION OF THE NZBORA 
Section 3 analysis 
The first issue to resolve is whether the censure of Goulden under the Council 
Codes of Conduct is included in the ambit of Section 3 of the NZ BORA and therefore 
subject to the NZBORA. Section 3 states that: 36 
This Bill of Rights applies only to acts done-
(a) by the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of the government ofNew 
Zealand; or 
(b) By any person or body in the perfo1mance of any public function, power, or duty 
conferred or imposed on that person or body by or pursuant to law. 
30 fbid, 11; Local Government Act 2002 Schedule? ,Clause 36. 
31 
Wellington City Council Code of Conduct, 12. 
32 Local Government Act 2002 Schedule ?,Clause 15(4 ). 
33 Wellington City Council Code of Conduct, 15. 
34 
Oxford dictionary meaning, 
http://dictionary. oed. corn. helicon. vu w.ac.n zJcgi/entry/50035538 ?query_ type=word&q ueryword=censurc& first= I &max 
to show=IO&sort typ alpha&result_place=l&scarch id= EVPw-16yYHy-7371&hilit 50035538(july21 2007) 13 - - -
Office of Controller and Auditor General, Local A 11/hority Codes of Cond11ct, (2006 ), 21. 
36 
New Zealand Bill of Rights 1990, s 3. 
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It can be argued that Local Government comes under the executive branch of 
government and is therefore caught under Section 3(a) of the NZBORA. The scope of the 
executive branch is not limited to the Governor General, ministers and their 
depm1ments.37 If something is considered 'governmental' in nature and is controlled by 
the executive it will fall within the broader interpretation of Section 3a of the 
NZBORA. 38 Although local authorities have a lot of self autonomy, they are controlled 
by the executive to the extent that they are governed by the LGA, and that there is a local 
government Minister appointed as an overseer.39 In Waitakere City Council v Lovelock40 
Thomas J stated that a local authority was a governmental institution, that exercises a 
constitutional role in the structure of the countries governance and that they are an 
important tier of government.41 
Alternatively if Goulden's censure doesn't fall within Section 3(a) it falls within 
Section 3(b) as it is an act done by a body perfonning a public function imposed on it by 
the LGA. In Ransfield v The Radio Network Ltd (Ransfield/2 Randerson J stipulated 
that the primary focus in a Section 3(b) inquiry is on the relevant function, power or duty 
rather than the nature of the entity at issue.43 Counsel for Wellington City Council in 
Goulden44 argued that because this matter related to a political function of a councillor 
being censured by his peers it doesn't fall within the definition of public function. 45 
However imposing sanctions on councillors in order to maintain the good governance of 
a council is inherently connected with the council's public role, in particular their ability 
to efficiently perform their public function. 
The fact that parliament has been motivated to enact Schedule 7 Clause 15 of the 
LGA indicates that acts done in the course of pursuing the function imposed by this 
37 Paul Rishwo11h, Grant Huscroft, Scott Optican, Richard Mahoney The Nell' Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford 
University Press, Auckland, 2003) 82. 
38 fbid , 84. 
39 Local Government Acts 3, 18, 31, 253-258, Schedule I . 
.w Waitakere City Council v Lovelock [1997] 2 ZLR 385 (CA). 
41 
Ibid, 413-414 (CA) Thomas J. 
42 Ransfield v The Radio Network Ltd. [2005] 1 NZLR 233 (H C) 
43 fbid , para 69 (HC) Randerson J. 
44 Goulden v Wellington City Council, above n 1. 
45 Submissions for counsel for Respondent in Goulden v Wellington City Coimdl, CIV 2005/485/001 
45. 
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enactment such as sanctioning councillors under the codes of conduct are likely to be of 
public character.46 This was articulated in Mercury Energy Ltd v Electricity Corp. of NZ 
Ltr/7 a judicial review case that addresses issues that can be considered in an analysis of 
Section 3(b)ofthe NZBORA. The House of Lords held that because ECNZs overall 
functions, which were deemed to be public in nature, were conferred by statute their 
contract making powers could also be considered public even though they weren ' t 
deemed to be a direct exercise of that pub) ic function.48 
Goulden's censure satisfies the Ransfielr/9 indicia outlined by Randerson J which is a 
non exclusive list used as a guideline to establish whether an action falls under Section 
3 (b ). 50 Whether the source of the function , power, or duty is statutory, the extent and 
nature of any governmental control of the entity, whether the entity is exercising 
functions, powers of duties which affect the rights , powers, p1ivileges, immunities, duties 
or liabilities of any person, or whether the entity is democratically accountable through 
the ballot box or in other ways are the indicia that are applicable in the case of the 
censure.51 Therefore Goulden's censure can be considered an act done under Section 3 
and the NZBORA will apply. 
A Illegality 
Illegality is the first head ofreview that I will address and I will assess whether 
Goulden 's censure can be stuck down under this head. A decision or act by a person or 
body that is susceptible to judicial review, will be reviewable for any breach of the law 
including a breach of the NZBORA. 52 Decisions can be protected from a NZBORA 
dispute if the empowering statute that has conferred the power or imposed the function on 
46 Rishworth , above n 37, 80 . 
47 Merc111y Energy Ltd. v £/eclricity Corp of NZ Ltd [ 1994] 2 Z LR 385 (PC) 
48 Ibid , 388 , Lord Templeman. 
49 
Ransjield v Th e Radio Netwo rk Lid, above n 42. 
50 Ibid , para 69 (HC) Rander o n J. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Philip Joseph Con stitutional and Administrative Law in N ew Z ealand (2 ed, Brookers, Welling ton, 2001 ) 
921,778, 784-785. 
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the body, indicates a clear parliamentary intention to breach the NZBORA pursuant to 
Section 4 of the NZBORA. 53 However it will be rare that an empowering statute will be 
found to authorise a breach of the NZBORA, and a statutory scheme would have to be 
deemed completely unworkable before the com1s would interpret an enactment as an 
intentional ovetTide of the NZBORA.54 Because the codes of conduct are a type of 
delegated legislation the principle of illegality that will be most relevant is the doctrine of 
ultra vires. If the council has acted outside of its jurisdiction in implementing the codes of 
conduct that include a breach of the NZBORA, without authorisation from the LGA then 
the courts can deem the codes of conduct to be ultra vires and of no legal affect. 55 This 
concept will be explored further with the discussion and application of Drew v Attorney 
General (Drew). 56 
1 Drew v Attorney General 
Drew57 is the leading authority on how to treat delegated legislation that breaches 
the NZBORA. In Drew58 the regulation at issue was held to be ultra vires because it 
exceeded the powers confe1Ted on it by the empowe1ing act.59 The regulation denied 
p1isoners rights to natural justice, and in accordance with section 6 of the NZBORA the 
empowering legislation had to be read consistently with the NZBORA.60 Unless the 
words of the empowering act explicitly intend to confer a power that breaches the 
NZBORA, whereby Section 4 of the NZBORA will apply, any regulation that does 
exceed its regulation making powers will be deemed ultra vires.61 
53 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 , s 4; Joseph, above n 52,922,785. 
54 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 , s 6; Joseph , above n 52, 785, 922. 
55 Drew v Attorney Cenera/[2002] 1 ZLR 58,920 (CA) Bland1ard J. 
56 Drel\' v A t/orney Genera l [2002) I ZLR 58 (CA). 
57 [bid . 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid , para 66 (CA)Blanchard J. 
60 Ibid , para 68 (CA) Blanchard J. 
61 Rishworth above n 37, 157. 
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There is an issue as to whether the rule in Drew62 can apply to the Codes of 
Conduct as they are a unique set of rules, created by councils under their statutory 
obligations conferred by Schedule 7 of the LGA. A large amount of discretion is left to 
the councils in deciding what form their codes will take. Some councils have 
implemented a code that is merely an unenforceable statement about the type of conduct 
the council wants to aspire to, while others have implemented codes similar to that of the 
Wellington City Councils that treat the code as an enforceable governance instrument 
similar to a Standing Order.63 This illustrates that Schedule 7 Clause 15 of the LGA has 
autho1ised various types of codes of conduct, and the inconsistent implementation of the 
codes across the country raises issues about what type of status the codes hold at law. 
They cannot be classified as an 'enactment' which is defined as 'whole or part of an Act 
or a Regulation' as per Section 29 of the Interpretation Act 1999 as they are not an Act or 
a regulation as they are not a 'regulation or rule made under an Act by the Govemor-
General, a Minister of the Crown, or an order in council.' 64 Anything deemed to be a 
regulation in the Regulations Act 1936 is also included in the Sec 29(e) Interpretation Act 
definition. The Regulations Act 1936 states that the definition of regulation does not 
include regulations made by any local authoiity. 65 Therefore the codes of conduct do not 
hold the status ofregulations at law. 
This has two consequences, firstly Sections 4 and 6 of the NZBORA which deal 
with 'enactments' do not directly apply to the codes ofconduct and secondly their 
unclear status at law leaves open the question about whether Drew66 is applicable. 
Because the censure of a councillor under the codes falls under sec 3, the NZBORA 
would still be applicable, however the way in which the NZBORA is applied is affected 
by whether or not the codes can be considered an enactment or another fo1111 of delegated 
legislation. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Office of Controller and Auditor General, Local Authority Codes ofCond11c1, (2006), I; John Sheppard, "Codes of 
Conduct- Ongoing Education" in Conference Papers - Le.xisNe:xis Professional Del'elopment 3rd Annual 
Local Government Legal Fomm 2004, 1. 
64 Interpretation Act 1999 , s 29. 
65 Regulations Act 1936, s 2(1 ) . 
66 Drew v Attorney General, above n 55 . 
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Because the codes are still a fonn of delegated legislation, as they are 'rules oflaw 
promulgated by a delegate of parliament entrusted with specific powers oflegislation,' 67 
Drew68 will be applicable. 
(a) Applying Drew v Attorney General 
(i) Empowering pro vis ion 
To detennine the validity of the code of conduct, the words of Schedule 7 clause 
15 of the LGA, must be interpreted to establish whether they can be read consistently 
with the NZBORA in accordance with sec 6 ofNZBORA.69 The words of Schedule 7 of 
the LGA do not impo11 any prima facie inconsistency with the NZBORA either implicitly 
or explicitly. Clause 15(1 )(a) outlines a broad direction about what should be included in 
the codes of conduct, but nothing in the general wording of Clause l 5(a)(i) contradicts 
the NZBORA. For the com1 to infer from Clause 15 any authorisation for a local council 
to create a code of conduct that had provisions that breached the NZBORA there would 
have to be a much clearer parliamentary intent.70 
(ii) Wellington City Council Code of Conduct 
The Wellington City Council Code of Conduct however, contains an 
inconsistency with Section 14 of the NZBORA. The provisions of the code at issue in 
Gouldens censure, which state that a councillor cannot do anything which compromises 
the impartiality of an employee, and that they cannot publicly criticise an employee in 
any way especially in ways that reflect on the competence and integrity of the employee, 
impinge on a councillors ability to impart info1mation or express their opinions. 
2 Freedom of Expression 
67 Joseph, above n 51 , 890 . 
68 Drew v Attorney General , above n 55. 
69New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 6; Drew v Attorney General, above n 55 , para 68 Blanchard J. 
70 Joseph, above n 52, 922 ,7 85. 
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Section 14 of the NZBORA states that: 71 
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, 
receive, and impai1 information and opinions of any kind. 
In Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review72 freedom of expression was declared 
to be 'as wide as human thoughts and imagination"73 and it is a central fundainental 
democratic right which has a long history in New Zealand legal tradition.74 One of the 
main principles behind the 1ight is that it is int1insically connected with a democratic 
government and that it is an essential tool in maintaining an effective democracy. 75 This 
is a long established p1inciple promulgated by John Milton,76 John Stuai1 Milton,77 and 
Sir Jan1es Fitzjames Stephen. 78 When freedom of expression is put into the wider New 
Zealand political and social context, the impo11ance of the right as a democratic 
imperative is better understood. The principle of democracy underlies New Zealand's 
constitutional and political system because we are a constitutional monarchy with a 
democratically elected government who ai·e responsible to parliament and who are 
accountable to New Zealand citizens.79 Sustaining democracy is impo11ant in maintaining 
this political and constitutional stmcture and the first exainple of this is the enactment of 
the NZBORA. Its focus on political and civil rights and protecting political processes 
illustrate the weight given to democratic rights in this country. 80 
The impo11ant role freedom of expression plays in maintaining democracy is 
evident with the enactment oflegislation such as the Official In fonnation Act 1982 [OIA J 
7 1 New Zealand Bill ofRights Act 1990, s 14 . 
72 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000) 2 NZLR 9 (CA). 
73 Ibid , para 14 (CA) Tipping J. 
74 Andrew and Petra Butler The New Zealand 8111 of Rights Act; a commenta1y (Lexis exis, Wellington, 
2005) 303. 
75 Television New Zealand v R [ 1996] 3 NZLR 393,396 - 397(CA) Keith J; Rish worth, above n 36,3 10; Butler, 
above n 74, 308-309. 
76 John Milton A reopagitica ( 1644) 18, 51-52 cited in Lange v Atkinson [1998] 3 NZLR 424,460-461 (CA) Blanchard 
J. 
77 John Stuart Mi II , On Liberty (1859) cited in Lange v Atkinson, above n 76, 460-461 (CA) Blanchard J. 
78 Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, A histo,y of th e criminal law in England vol ii ( 1883) 229-300 cited in 
Lange v Atkinson, above n 76, 460-461 (CA) Blanchard J. 
79 Lange v Atkinson, above n 76, 463 (CA) Blanchard J. 
80 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 , s 12, 13 , 14 , 15, 16, 17, I 8. 
14 
which allows for the free flow of official information to the public. The principles 
underlying the OIA highlight the right New Zealanders have to patticipate in the process 
of policy and decision making and their ability to hold the government accountable.
81 The 
removal of the offence of criminal libel, and the offences of publishing unt:me matters 
calculated to influence votes during an election campaign in the Defatnation Act 1992 ai·e 
further indications of a move towards engaging public debate on political matters. 
82 The 
defence of qualified p1ivilege in defamation which is available to litigants when the 
subject matter of the defamation concerns actions or qualities that affect the capacity of 
MPs to meet their public responsibilities is another example of the importance placed on 
freedom of expression in sustaining democracy through political debate. 
83 
Therefore the impo1tance of the right to freely express an opinion as a democratic 
tool is especially relevant in this situation as the Councillors ai·e an elected representation 
of Wellington City and are accountable and responsible for monitoring the perfo1mance 
and resources of the council.
84 The right to freely express an opinion relating to these 
principles is directly in line with the roles and responsibilities of a councillor. 
3 Section 5 and Deference 
In accordance with section 5, if the limit placed on a councillor's ability to 
express their opinion is presc1ibed by law and is demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society the obligations in the Code will no longer be at issue with the 
NZ BORA. 85 If the inconsistent meaning is justified pursuant to section 5, the 
inconsistency is overtaken by the justification and in effect sec 5 legitimises the 
inconsistency. 86 Establishing whether the codes of conduct are prescribed by law is the 
first element of sec 5 that can be satisfied. The limits on the tight have to be 'prescribed' 
81 Lange v Atkinson, above n 76, 463-464 (CA) Blanchard J. 
82 Ibid, 464 (CA) Blanchard J. 
83 Lange v Atkinson (2000] 3 NZLR 385 (CA). 
84 Wellington City Council Code of Conduct, 9; Office of controller and Auditor General, Managing the 
relation"~1ip between a local authorities Elected Members and its Chief Executive, (2002) Part 4 4.5 4.6. 
85 R v Hansen (2007] NZSC SC 58/2005 7, para 90 (SC) Tipping] . 
86 Ibid. 
15 
meaning they have to be asce11ainable by the public and able to be understood.87 The 
code of conduct is accessible and understandable to the public and the councillors. The 
limits on the right have to also be a legally authorised and have the force of law. The 
codes of conduct have been authorised by legislation and therefore they are prescribed by 
law. 88 
The recent 2007 Supreme Com1 decision in R v Hansen89 has provided a strong 
direction in how to construct a Section 5 analysis. The com1 adopted the Canadian test 
from R v Oakes, 90 and the majority held that a section 5 analysis should take place 
straight after an inconsistency is found so as not to subvert any deliberate policy choice 
parliament may have intended when enacting a limit.91 Tipping J held that a level of 
deference should be given to Parliament and that section 5 is an instruction to the courts 
not only to review Parliament's legislation but also to respect parliament's appreciation 
of the limit they have placed on the right.92 He used the analogy of a shooting target to 
illustrate the varying levels of deference that are required. The comts view on what a 
justified limit is represents the bull's eye and the surrounding target area represents the 
amount of deference the courts can allow.93 If the legislation being reviewed is a 
substantive political , social or economic issue the target area is larger, whereas if the 
issue was a matter of substantial legal content the target area would be smaller. Therefore 
the cou11s appreciate that in areas where they have a level of competence and expe11ise 
their appraisal of the quality of the legislation is waITanted , but in areas that have a heavy 
policy content Parliament is best suited to make the decisions.
94 
In the Goulden situation where local autho1ities regulate the expression of 
councillors the courts will be mindful that councils are a democratically elected body, as 
87 Sunday Tim es v United Kingdom ( 1979) 2 EHRR 245 adopted by New Zealand courts in Minister of 
Transpo1t v Noori [ 1992] 3 NZLR 260 (CA); Solicitor General v Radio New Zealand Ltd [1994] 1 NZLR 
48. 
88 Authorised by Local Government Act 2002, Schedule 7 Clause 15 . 
89 R v Han sen, above n 85. 
90 R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103 
91 R v Han sen, above n 83 , para 90-92 (SC) Tipping J. 
92 Ibid, para 105-111 (SC) Tipping J. 
93 Ibid , para I 19 (SC) Tipping J. 
94 Ibid , para I 16 (SC) Tipping J. 
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elected councils are usually afforded a high level of deference.95 Goddard J recognised 
this when she cited Wellington City Council v Woolworths (No 2/6 as authority that 
comts will not interfere into areas that are clearly within the council's jurisdiction. 
Underlying this is the p1inciple that unelected judges should be weary of substituting their 
decisions with those of the democratically elected representatives.97 Goddard J 
categorised the Codes of Conduct as an internal regulatory tool and too political an issue 
for a cout1 to interfere with. 98 However the Codes of Conduct can be viewed as a 
regulatory tool that is more disciplinary in nature than political, and therefore there is 
scope for more judicial scrutiny.99 The effect of the limit on the councillors must be taken 
into consideration when determining how deferential the court should be, because the 
comts feel it is their role to protect individuals rights. 100 The relevant provisions impact 
on the councillor's ability to exercise core political speech which is an area that the courts 
are more prepared to scrutinise. '0 ' The court will also take into consideration the 
consequences of the limit on the individuals effected, for example the consequences for 
the councillors if they breach the code ofconduct. 102 Although the appropriate sanction is 
left up to the council's discretion there are no boundaries in place restricting a council 
from imposing more serious penalties such as removing a councillor from their positions 
on committees or other bodies, or dismissal from chai1ing boards. 103 However Councils 
do not have autho1ity to remove or suspend a member from council or to enforce a fine or 
suspension of remuneration. 1(}4 Tipping J stated that the level of deference may vary in 
each limb of the sec 5 test; therefore a unifo1m standard of deference is not necessary. 105 
95 See for example Wellington City Counci.l v Woolworths New Zealand Ltd (No 2) [1996] 2 NZLR 537, 
Waitakere City Counol v Lovelock, above n 39. 
96 Wellington City Council v Woolworths New Zealand Ltd (No2), above n 95. 
97 R v Hansen, above n 85, para 124 (SC) Tipping J. 
98 Goulden v Wellington City Council, above n I . 
99 Joseph, above n 52 ,838 . 
100 Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v Roussel Uclaf Australia Pty Ltd [1998] ZAR 58, 66 (CA) 
Blanchard J; Thames Valley Electric Power Board v NZ Forest Products Pulp & Paper Ltd [1994] 2 NZLR 
641, 653 (CA) Cooke P. 
101 See Pa11 III A 2 Freedom of Expression.; Lange v Atkinson, above n 76. 
102 This is linked with protecting human rights . See Phal7flaceutical Management Agency Ltd v Roussel Uc/af 
Australia Pty Ltd, above n I 00, 66 (CA) Blanchard J; Thames Valley Electric Poll'er Board v NZ Forest Products Pulp 
& Paper Ltd, above n I 00, 653 (CA) Cooke P; Joseph , above n 52,838. 
103 Office of Controller and Auditor General, Local Authon'ty Codes of Conduct, (2006) 45. 
104 Ibid, 45. 
105 R v Hansen, above n 85 Tipping J. 
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4 Applying the Oakes test 
The two requirements of the test which must be satisfied are firstly whether the 
objective is sufficiently important and secondly the proportionality of the means chosen 
to achieve the objective. 106 
The first question in the test is whether the objectives of the two provisions of the 
code of conduct at issue are pressing and substantial. '07 The objective is to protect council 
staff from being criticised by councillors in order to protect them from attacks on their 
impartiality or integrity. 108 The overall aim of these provisions is to promote a healthy 
working relationship in the council, and for the council to avoid being subject to 
employment litigation for not fulfilling their obligations to be good employers. 109 The 
court held in Oakes1 10 that the standard for assessing whether a legislative objective is 
pressing and substantial has to be high and trivial objectives or those discordant with a 
free and democratic society will not be protected. 111 It is not disputed that the protection 
of staff from attacks on their competence and integrity is an important objective for local 
authorities. Protecting the impartiality and credibility of the council staff is impo1tant not 
only for the purposes of avoiding employment litigation but also to promote good 
working relations between councillors and staff members. The strncture of local 
government is such that the Chief Executive Officer is the only council employee that is 
accountable to the elected members and therefore council staff should be afforded the 
same protection from criticism that is afforded to any employee. 11 2 Ensu1ing that council 
staff are kept impaitial and are not involved unnecessaiily in the political arena of local 
government ai·e all impo1tant goals of a council. 
106 Ibid, para 120-121 , Tipping J citing Mu Itani v Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bou,geyo [2006] 1 SCR 
256. 
107 fbid ; R v Oakes, above n 90 , 138 . 
108 Wellington City Council Code of Conduct 11. 
109 Ibid, 5, 11. 
11 0 R v Oakes, above n 90. 
111 R v Hansen, above n 85 (SC) Tipping J citing R v Oakes, above n 90 , 138 . 
11 2 Office of Controller and Auditor General , Local Authoriry Codes of Conduct, (2006), 24 . 
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It is helpful to address the wider context of the two relevant provisions and look at 
the Auditor Generals assessment of the codes of conduct in general. He found that there 
did not seem to be any mischief that the Government was trying to address in enacting 
Schedule 7 clause 15 which applies directly to the two provisions at issue because they 
emanate from clause 15(2)(a)(i). Instead Schedule 7 was enacted because of a unanimous 
agreement between local body organisations, in addition to the codes receiving support 
from submitters at the Local Government refo1m consultation stage' 13 and because of an 
interest in keeping New Zealand in line with local government reforms in the United 
Kingdom that had recently adopted a Code of Conduct. 114 This suggests that there was 
not a pressing or substantial objective that the legislature was trying to remedy by 
enacting clause 15. However the report outlines the amount of support clause 15 had from 
those involved in local government, illustrating the obvious need for a provision that 
implemented a standard of conduct. 115 Regardless of the seemingly high threshold in 
Oakes' 16 the Com1s have rarely held that an objective isn't pressing and substantial and 
most cou11s are deferential to parliament when this limb of the test is applied. 11 7 It is 
highly probable that a com1 would hold the objectives of the code of conduct to be 
pressing and substantial. 
The second limb of the test which assesses whether the means used to achieve this 
objective are reasonably and demonstrably justified has been split into three subpa11s. 
a) Are the means used to achieve the objective rationally connected to the objective?' 18 
11 3 Department of Internal Affairs, 2001. Review of Local Government Act 1974; Synopsis of submissions; 
Ley land , Tim The Desiffn and Implementation of Codes of Conduct in New Zealand local Covemment 
2003-2004 (MMPM Research paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 2005); Affidavit of Basil James 
Morrison President of Local Government New Zealand in Goulden v Wellington City Cmmdl, above n 1 
CIV 2005-485-001,2-3 
114 Leyland, above n 111 ; Office of Controller and Auditor General, Local A111ho1iry Codes of Co11d11c1, (2006) 
11 5 Affidavit of Basil James Monison President of Local Government New Zealand in Goulden v Wellington 
Ciry Council, above n I CIV 2005-485-001,2-3, 5-6. 
116 R v Oakes, above n 90. 
117 Rishwo1ih, above n 3 7, 177 ; Butler, above n 74, 143 , Only one case R v Zundel [ 1992] 2 SCR 731 has failed 
at this limb of the test; R v Hansen, above n 85, para 207 (SC) McGrath. 
11 8 R vHansen, above n 85, para 212 (SC) McGrath. R vOakes, above n 90,139. 
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The methods used to achieve the objective of the code must be carefully designed 
and 'must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations.' 119 The means 
used are the restrictions placed on an elected member to express any view or opinion 
about the perfonnance of a staff member that criticises them or affects their impartiality 
to anyone other than the chief executive. Therefore the means used are rationally 
connected to the objective because preventing councillors from communicating their 
opinions about a staff member directly relates to protecting staff members from having 
their integrity or competence criticised, and avoids any interference with their 
impaitiality. 
b) Is the impai1ment on the right to freedom of expression greater than reasonably 
necessary to achieve the objective? 120 
The impai1ment on the right to freely express an opm1on or viewpoint 1s 
substantially impaired by the code of conduct, because councillors are restricted m 
expressing any view on a staff member that is critical or affects their impartiality. In 
Livingstone v The Adjudication Panel for England121 Collins J held that while the 
restraints on the right to freedom of expression in a code of conduct is likely to be within 
a1ticle 10 (UK equivalent of NZBORA Section 14), it is important that the restraints 
should not go further than is necessary to maintain the standards set out in the code. 122 It 
may be acceptable to limit a councillors freedom of expression in matters that do not 
relate to their democratic duties to act as a representative of the ratepayers and as an 
overseer of the council resources. 123 For example the codes of conduct could restrict 
councillors expressing there opinions about council staff about matters that doesn't 
directly relate to their responsibilities as councillors to monitor and develop council 
policies and resources. Council staff should be afforded a level of protection that ensures 
they are not subject to personal abuse or insults about their character or personal life. 
However this alternative will not achieve the objective properly because councillors 
would still be able to c1iticise staff members in situations where they deem the councils 
11 9 R v Oakes, above n 90 , 139. 
120 R v Hansen, above n 85 , para 126 Tipping J, para 79 Blanchard J. 
121 Livingstone v Th e Adjudication Panel.for England [2006] EWHC 2533 (admin) 
122 Ibid, para 33 Collins J. 
123 The role of the councillors is outlined in Wellington C ity Code o f Conduct, 9 . 
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perfo1mance to be inadequate or where council resources are being misused, which would 
still result in a staff members competence and integrity being criticised and their 
impa11iality impaired. So while the impact on the right is substantial their does not seem 
to be any other way in which the objective can be achieved without using the means 
employed. 
c) Are the effects on the right proportionate to the objective?1 24 
Is the impainnent on the right justifiable in light of the objective of protecting the 
credibility and impartiality of staff? As established above the objective of protecting 
council staff is an imp011ant objective. However the means used to achieve this objective 
are not proportionate to the objective. To limit the councillor's rights to express any 
opinion about a staff member that relates to their competence or integrity undermines one 
of the fundamental principles of the right, which is to promote and maintain 
democracy. 125 One of council's main functions is to act as an elected overseer of the 
perfo1mance and management of the council which is a principle that is also included in 
the Code of Conduct. 126 This role is intiinsically connected with their right to freedom of 
expression, and a limit placed on the ability of the Councillors to perform this role is 
objectionable. "Freedom of expression is subject to only clearly defined exceptions laid 
down by statute or the common law, it cannot be too strongly emphasised that outside the 
established exceptions there is no question of balancing freedom of expression against 
other interests , it is a trump card that always wins." 127 Limits have been placed on 
freedom of expression by the laws of defan1ation, confidentiality and p1ivacy which 
demonstrates that in ce11ain situations opposing 1ights and interests do take precedence 
over the sec 14 right. 128 There is a possibility that if the Code only limited the rights of 
the councillors when they express a view that is personal in nature the effects on the right 
would be proportionate to the objective. However because of the democratic nature of 
local authorities , the protection of staff members may need to be compromised in order 
124 R v Oakes, above n 90, 139; R v Han sen, above n 85, para 132 (SC) Tipping J. 
125 See Part III A 2 Freedom of Expression. 
126 Wellington City Council Code of Conduct, 9. 
127 livmgstone v The Adjudication Panel for England, above n 121, para 35 Collins J citing Hoffman LJ in R 
v Central Television Plc /1994] 3 All E.R 641 at 652. 
128 R v Hansen, above n 85, para 263 (SC) Anderson J. 
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for the councillors to remain accountable to the ratepayers. The impo11ance placed on 
freedom of expression and democracy in New Zealand makes it highly unlikely that any 
court will compromise the right. 129 Therefore the protection of the staff members 
credibility, impat1iality and integ1ity is not a justifiable impainnent on the councillors 
right to freedom of expression. 
The Oakes130 test set out in Hansen 131 has not been satisfied and therefore the 
breach of Section 14 ofNZBORA contained in the code of conduct is not demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society as per Section 5 of the NZBORA. 
Because the codes of conduct are not 'enactments,' section 6 does not apply to 
them directly. However it is at this step in the analysis that a section 6 type construction 
would take place to construe the provisions in the codes of conduct to have a NZBORA 
consistent meaning. If it is possible to read the Code in a way that didn't impinge on the 
right to freedom of expression then the codes would no longer be considered ultra 
vires. 132 This is because if the codes have a NZBORA consistent meaning then they are in 
line with their empowering provision and are no longer exceeding the autho1ity imposed 
by the statute. 133 
The words in the code of conduct explicitly illustrate the intention of the code of 
conduct _to restrict all acts that could compromise or c1iticise a staff members integrity, 
impa11iaJity or integrity. It states that councillors 'must not do anything which 
compromises their impru1ia1ity' and that they 'must avoid publicly criticising any 
employee in any way, but especially in ways that reflect on the competence and integrity 
of the employee.' 134 A more limited meaning of these provisions and a more NZBORA 
consistent meaning as propounded above can not be construed from these words. The 
129 See Part III A 2 Freedom of Expression. 
130 R v Oakes, above n 90. 
131 R v Hansen, above n 85. 
132 Rishwo1ih, above n 3 7, 160 footnote 228. 
133 Joseph, above n 52 ,919, 921-923. Delegated legislation that pem1its what the enabling statute prohibits 
will be considered repugnant so if the delegated legislation can be construed as in line with its enabling 
statute then it will no longer be ultra vires or repugnant. 
134 (Emphasis added) Wellington City Council Code of Conduct, 11 . 
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Code was clearly intended to inhibit councillors speaking on any matters relating to staff 
members especially those related to their abilities and perfo1mances in their jobs and 
limiting the provisions so that they only apply to councillors compromising or criticising 
staff members on personal matters such as their character or personal lives would be 
unquestionably stretching the language of the Code. It is not necessary to discuss whether 
the use of nonnal statutory interpretation methods used in a section 6 analysis apply, and 
what level of deference should be given to local authorities in assessing their intentions 
when drafting these provisions. This is because the wording of the provisions is incapable 
of being construed in any other way. 
5 Conclusion on Illegality 
Applying Drew135, Clause 15 (l)(i) of Schedule 7 of the LGA cannot authorize a 
code of conduct to be adopted that breaches the NZBORA. Pursuant to Section 6 of the 
NZBORA these provisions cannot be interpreted as authorising individual councils to 
enact codes of conduct that include provisions such as the offending provisions in the 
Wellington City Councils code which unjustifiably breach the NZBORA. The words are 
too general to impo11 any express intention by parliament to authorise a breach of any 
rights. Because the limit on the right to freedom of expression in the codes of conduct is 
not justifiable pursuant to law in a free and democratic society and cannot be construed in 
way that is consistent with the empowering act and the NZBORA it is invalid and has no 
effect. Therefore the Wellington City Council do not have jmisdiction to use it to censure 
councillors and Goulden's censure can be deemed invalid. 
Although it is not necessa1y to analyse Goulden 's statement in the Cook Strait 
News in tenns of whether it was in fact a breach of the code of conduct, I will address it 
in case I an1 inco1Tect about the codes being ultra vires. It is arguable that the statement 
made by Goulden could not be deemed to be in breach of the two provisions at issue 
because there was no undertone of criticism, and the content was more a statement of the 
135 Drew v Attorney General, above n 55 . 
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facts. 136 However the financial officer is singled out in the statement and the words 'it's 
reckless' do imply an element of criticism towards him and although I believe this 
statement is not a gross breach of the Code these two factors have caused the statement to 
be construed as a breach by the Councillors. 
B Unreasonableness 
Unreasonableness is the second head of review that this paper will address. It will 
consider Goddard Js approach to unreasonableness in Goulden 137 and then go on to 
outline the developments that have occuITed in this head of review due to the enactment 
of the NZBORA by outlining the case law in New Zealand and England. The purpose of 
this overview is firstly to illustrate the way in which the NZBORA and the English 
equivalent the Human Rights Act (UK) 1998 [HRA] has influenced a change in how this 
head ofreview is assessed by the com1s when a decision involves a human rights issue. 
The second purpose of the overview is to demonstrate how e1rnneous Goddard Js 
approach was in Goulden. 138 
The first two heads ofreview look at the processes by which a decision was made 
but the unreasonableness head requires the court to look into the merits of the decision, 
bearing in mind that they are exercising a review function and are not acting as an appeal 
court. 139_ The com1s are very wary of demonstrating deference to the primary decision 
maker, and they must display respect for the decision by not delving unnecessarily into 
the substance of the decision and evaluating the quality of it. Unreasonableness however 
requires the com1 to step in when a decision made is considered so unreasonable that it 
cannot be upheld. 140 The outcome relies on what unreasonableness test the courts apply. 
1 Goddard Jsfindings 
136 Goulden v Wellington City Council, above n I , para 6 (HC) Goddard J. 
137 Goulden v Wellington City Council, above n I. 
138 Ibid 
139 Joseph, above n 52 ,830 . 
140 Ibid. 
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Goddard J held that because the Council's Code of conduct is an internal 
regulatory manual it is up to the council to decide on any matters that affect it and any 
transgression of its code of conduct is up to the council to assess. 141 She stated that the 
courts will only intervene when the decision is unreasonable and she applied the 
unreasonable test from Associated Provisional Houses Ltd v Wednesbury C01p. 142 This 
test known as Wednesbury unreasonableness sets the standard for courts to determine 
whether a decision is unreasonable if it is 'so unreasonable that no reasonable authority 
would ever have come to it.' 143 She supp011s her highly deferential approach with the 
statements from Lord Diplock in CCSU144 that the decision must be "So outrageous in its 
defiance oflogic that no reasonable person who had applied his mind to the question 
could have arrived at it," 145 and Lord Scannan in Nottingham County Council v Secretary 
of State for the Environment146 who held that the decision must be "so absurd the decision 
maker must have taken leave of their senses." 147 She also applied Wellington City 
Council v Woolworths (No2) 148 to illustrate that New Zealand comts are reluctant to 
interfere with matters that are within the special province of a council. 149 Her Honour's 
use of case authorities that strongly advocate a deferential approach when assessing the 
merits of its decision illustrate her viewpoint about the extent to which a com1 should 
interfere with the substance of a decision. She held that there was no reasonable basis to 
find that the majority vote for censure was Wednesbmy unreasonable and that the comts 
should not intervene on such a political decision unless such a basis presented itself. 150 
2 New Zealand Developments 
141 Goulden v Wellington City Council, above n 1 para 59 (HC) Goddard J. 
142 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesb111y Co1p [1948] 1 KB 223. 
143 Ibid, Lord Greene. 
i-1-1 Coundl of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Senoce [1985] AC 374 (HL) 
145 Ibid, 410 Lord Diplock . 
146 Nottingham County Council v Secret my of State for th e Environment [ 1986] AC 240 
147 Ibid, 24 7 Lord Scannan 
148 
Wellington City Council v Woo!H ·orths Ne11 · Zealand Lid. above n 95 (CA) Richardson P. 
149 Goulden v Wellington City Council, above nl , para 59-60 (HC) Goddard J. 
150 Goulden v Wellington City Council, above n 1, para 60 (CA) Goddard J. 
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However New Zealand's case law has developed in this area and it has moved on 
from the st1ict Wednesbury test applied by Goddard J. 151 The courts now take the 
approach that unreasonableness can be determined using a vaiiety of methods ranging in 
their intensity ofreview depending on the context of the situation and other relevant 
factors. 152 Context has in fact become a central element in administrative law 153 and long 
established principles have been eroded or challenged by new concepts including this 
new approach of a "sliding scale" or "rainbow of standards ofreview." 154 One of the 
main reasons behind this shift is the integration of administrative law with constitutional 
law under the title of public law. 155 This shift has been sparked by the developments in 
the area of human rights and their incorporation into the review process with concepts 
such as anxious scmtiny review, proportionality review and 'hard look' review ente1ing 
the field. 156 This new approach can be seen in cases such as Discount Brands 157 where the 
New Zealand Supreme Cou1t quashed the Comt of Appeals decision to apply 
Wednesbury unreasonableness, because impo11ant legal values such as natural justice and 
public pai1icipation had been encroached upon. The court held that any decision made 
under a statute that abridged those rights had to be cautiously exercised and would be 
carefully scrutinised by the courts. 158 New Zealand's position on when and under what 
circumstances a decision will be more carefully scrutinised has not been settled by the 
courts as yet, and it is still a developing area of the law. 159 
151 Ports of Auckland ltd v Auckland City Council [ 1999) I NZLR 60 I 606 (HC); Progressive Enterprises Ltd v North 
Shore City Council [2006) NZRMA 72 (HC) para 70-72; Wolf v Minister of Immigration [2004) NZAR 414 (HC) 
Discount Brands Ltd v Westfield (NZ) Ltd [2005) 2 ZLR 597 (SC); Poll'erco v Commerce commission: Vector Ltd v 
Commerce Commission (9 June 2006) HC WN CN-2005-485-1220; CN-2005-485-1220 Wild J. 
152 Michael Taggart "Administrative Law" [2006) I NZ L Rev 75, 83; Ports of Auckland ltd v Auckland City Council, 
above n 151; Progressive Enterpn·ses Ltd v No11h Shore City Council, above n 151,para 70-72 (HC); Wolf v Minister of 
Immigration , above 11 151 , para 25-48 (HC) Phamtacelllica/ Management Agency Ltd v Roussel Uc/a/ Australia Pty 
Ltd. above 11 I 00. 
153 R(Daly) v SecretC11y of State/or the Hom e Department [2001) 2 AC 532, para 28 (H L) Lord Steyn; Taggart, above 11 
152 , 83. 
154 Taggart, above n 152 , 83, Progressive Enterprises Ltd v North Shore City Council, above n 151 , para 70 (HC) 
Baragwanath J. 
155 Taggart, above 11 152, 83. 
156 Anxious Scrutiny- R v Secretary of State/or the Hom e department. exp Bugdaycay [ 1987) AC 514; Proportionality 
review Po\l'erco v Commerce commission : Vector Ltd v Commerce Commission. above 11 151 ; Hard look review cited 
with approval but not applied in Phamwceutical Management Agency Ltd v Roussel Uc/a/ Australia Pty Ltd, above n 
I 00; Shau• v A ttomey- General (1102) [2003) NZAR 216,239 (HC) per Wild J. 
157Discount Brands Ltd v Westfield. above 11 151 . 
158 Ibid, para 22-23, 25, Elias CJ, para 115 Blanchard J. 
159 Taggart, above n 152, 83-39. 
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3 Englands influence 
The developments in this area in England have had an influence on New 
Zealand's approach to incorporating the NZBORA into judicial review, particularly since 
the enactment of their HRA. Before the HRA was enacted claimants could incorporate 
complaints of breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) rights 
under this heads ofreview, and they continue to do so. 160 However the repat1iation of the 
ECHR into domestic law has seen an increase in the rate of judicial review claims in the 
domestic courts which incorporate claims of an ECHR breach. 161 The courts have since 
adapted the Wednesbury test to make it more flexible in light of their new responsibilities 
brought about by the HRA. 162 Wednesbury unreasonableness had in fact been applied in a 
less stringent way even before the enactment of the HRA, and va1ious courts had quashed 
decisions claiming they were Wednesbmy unreasonable even where there were 
arguments in there favour. 163 However in cases where rights have been affected the cou1ts 
have varied in there approach, and ultimately the English courts are in as much of a 
quandary as the New Zealand comts. 164 
The scale of intensity ofreview in England is as varied as New Zealand's scale. 165 
The English courts express their concerns about entering too far into a decision with a 
high policy context and restraining there scrutiny in areas that are not in line with there 
judicial_experience. 166 "Where decisions of a policy-laden, esoteric or secmity-based 
nature are in issue, even greater caution than n01mal must be shown." 167 Such cases 
require a light touch review, which is a lower level of scrutiny, demonstrating more 
160 Andrew Le Sueur "The Rise and Ruin of Unreasonableness?" [2005) JR, 34. 
161 Ibid. 
162 See Wolf v Minister of Immigration, above n 152, para 26 (HC) Wild J . 
163 See R v Comwall CC exp. Com wall and Isles o!Sdlly Guardians ad Litem and reporting Officers Panel 
[1992] 2 ALL ER 471; West Glamorgan CCv Rafferty [1987] 1 WLR 457, 477Ralph Gibson LJ; Peter Cane, 
Administrative Law,(4 ed, Oxford University Press, 2004)250. 
164 Compare R(Daly) v Secretary of State/or the Hom e Department, above n 153 ; R (Association of British Civilian 
Internees (Far East Region) vSecretary of Stale/or Defence [2003] EWCA Civ 473 [2003JQB 1397 Dyson LJ ; R(Pro-
/ife Alliance) v BBC [2003] UKHL 23 Lord Walker. 
165 See Le Sueur, above n 160, 39. 
166 R v Minist1y of Defence exp. Smith [1996) QB 517, 556 Sir Thomas Bingham . 
167 Ibid. 
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deference to parliament. 168 The decision will have to 'so absurd that the decision maker 
must have taken leave of his senses." 169 Goddard J cited this test in her judgement, 
illustrating her intent to restrict the level of scrntiny she was going to allow into the 
Councils decisions especially because this test is considered even more deferential than 
'ordinary Wednesbury' the next category on the scale. This test has been outlined above. 
The next catego1y and the catego1y that best illustrates the developments in the 
unreasonableness test is the 'anxious scrntiny' or 'super Wednesbury' category. 170 The 
test is 'whether a reasonable person on the material in front of him, could reasonably 
conclude that the interference with the right was justifiable." 171 This lowers the threshold 
of unreasonableness and it has been held that decisions infringing on rights should 
receive anxious scrutiny from the courts. 172 In R v Ministry of Defence exp. Smith 173 Sir 
Thomas Bingham held: 174 
"In judging whether the decision-maker has exceeded this margin of appreciation the human rights 
context is important. The more substantial the interference with human rights the more the cow1s 
will require by way of justification before it is satisfied that the decision is reasonable .... " 
However it has been increasingly argued that the various levels of intensity of 
review are inadequate tests to use to address cases that involve human tights. Andrew Le 
Sueur argues that the concept of unreasonableness in English law is a simple one. It 
establishes that the courts are to make a secondary decision, with the primaiy decision 
about the merits of the matter being left to public authorities. 175 However he claims that 
the unreasonableness test has taken on too much with the latest developments and that 
"Wednesbmy unreasonableness is in danger of imploding under the weight of 
expectations." 176 This is a reference to the way the courts have attempted to incorporate 
168 Notti11gha111shire Cou11ty Council v Secreta,y of State for the Environment, above n 146; R v Min islfy of Defence 
exp. vSmith,aboven 166. 
169 Nottinghamshire County Council v Secretary of State for the £nviro11111e11t, above n 146,247 Lord Scarrnan. 
170 Le Sueur, above n 160, 39. 
171 Brind v SecrefaJYofStatefortheHome department[1991] 1 All ER 720 (HL). 
172 See R v Saville Inquiry exp. A and others [1999] EWHC Admin 556, Roch LJ. 
173 R v Ministly of Defence exp. v Smith, above n 166. 
174 Ibid, 556 Lord Bingham. 
175 Le Sueur, above n 160, 32. 
176 Ibid. 
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human rights into the unreasonable test, something Le Sueur believes unreasonableness 
was never designed to do. 177 Therefore the fate of unreasonableness is still undetermined 
and the courts have been open to new approaches. 
4 Proportionality- a new approach 
The doct1ine of propo11ionality has emerged as a solution for English and New 
Zealand Com1s as some judges believe it is the appropriate standard of review when 
human rights are at issue. 178 The principle underlying proportionality is that a burden 
imposed by a decision must not be a dispropo11ionate method of achieving the desired 
purposes. 179 Essentially it is an adoption of a type of Oakes 180 test similar to that required 
by sec 5 of the NZBORA. 181 The scope and extent of the role of propo11ionality review in 
both countries is still undefined but New Zealand has being influenced by the 
advancement of this test in England. 182 The HRA was a catalyst for the com1s to consider 
prop011ionality as a separate head of review, p1imarily because the courts could no longer 
ignore their role in protecting rights 183 and they had the added pressure of being 
susceptible to European Com1 of Human Rights scrutiny. 184 The European Court also 
ruled that the traditional heads of review were no longer adequate to assess judicial 
review cases where rights were involved. 185 R (Alconbury Ltd) v Secreta,y of State for the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions 186 and R (Daly) v Secreta,y of State for the 
Home Department187 were the first post- HRA decisions that introduced the notion of 
177 Ibid. 
178 
R(Daly) v Secrela1y of State/or the Home Depa nment, above n 153, para 2 1,27 and 30 (HL) Lord Bingham, 
Steyn, and Cooke; R(A /conb11 ,y Ltd) v Secretary of State/or the En vironm ent, Transpon and rhe Regions [200 1 J 2 
WLR 1389 (HL). 
179 Joseph, above n 52 , 841 . 
180 R v Oakes, above 90 . 
181 Michael Taggart, "Administrative Law" (2003) NZ L Rev 99 , 115 . 
182 Jason Varuhas, "Powerco v Commerce Commission: Deve loping Trends o f Proportionality in New 
Zealand Administrative Law" (2006) 4 NZJPIL 339, 344 . 
183 R (A lconbury Ltd) v Secreta,y of State/or the Environment, Transport and th e Regions, above n 178 , 
para 51 Lord Slynn . 
18
~ Jason Varuhas, Keeping things in proponion : The judiciary, executive adion and human 1ights 
(LLB(Hons) Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 2003) 19. 
185 See for example Smith and Grady v United Kingdom (2000) 29 EHRR 493; Week v United Kingdom 
(1987) I O EHRR 293 ; Kingsley v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR. 
186 
R(A lco11b111y Ltd) v Secre/C/ly of State fo r the Environm ent, Transpon and !he Regions, above n 178 . 
187 R(Daly) v Secretary a/ State for the Hom e Dep artment, above n 153. 
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propo11ionality and its me1its as a separate head ofreview. In Alconbwy188 Lord Slynn 
stated that this level ofreview was necessary since the enactment of the HRA. 189 In 
Dal/90 Lord Steyn outlined that a propo11ionality test might be a 'more precise and 
sophisticated' test to use in cases involving human rights because it could require the 
court to assess the balance which the decision maker has struck, not merely whether it is 
within the range of rational or reasonable decisions. Secondly a proportionality test 'may 
go fu11her than the traditional grounds ofreview inasmuch as it may require attention to 
be directed to the relative weight accorded to interests and considerations.' 191 Thirdly the 
alternative tests such as 'heightened scrutiny' may not be approp1iate in the protection of 
human rights. 192 
h . 193 194 h · I d d However t e courts smce Daly and Alconbwy ave not consistent y a opte 
this approach or attempted to a11iculate it fu11her, prefening to retain the traditional 
deferential approach. 195 
5 Proportionality in New Zealand 
In a 2006 decision of Powerco Ltd v Commerce Commission 196 Wild J stated that 
while the three grounds ofreview in New Zealand were still illegality, unreasonableness 
and procedural improp1iety, New Zealand courts have moved on from the single 
Wednesbury standard to an intensity ofreview appropriate to the subject matter. He also 
reiterated that propo11ionality might be a stand alone head of review but did not elaborate 
or confirm this position. 197 Propo11ionality has been considered by New Zealand cou11s 
188 R(Alconbwy lid) v Secreta,y of State for the Environment, Transpo11 and the Regions, above 11 178. 
189 Ibid, para5 l Lord Slynn of Hadley. 
190 R(Da/y) v Secretary of State for the Home Depal1!nent, above 11 153. 
191 Da(y, above n 153 , para 27 Steyn. 
192 Ibid. 
193 Daly, above n 153. 
194 Alconbwy, above n 178 . 
195 Tom Hickman , "Proportionality: Comparative Law Lessons," [2007) JR, 33. See for example R v BBC, 
ex pa rte Profile Alliance [2003]UKHL 23, para 75 (HL) Lord Hoffman; Secreta,y ofStatefor the Hom e 
Department v Reh an [2001] UKHL 4 7, para 62 (HL) Lord Hoffman; A,X, Y v Secreta,y of State for th e 
Hom e Department [2003) HRLR 3, para 40 (CA) Lord Woolfe CJ. 
196 Powerco ltd v Commerce Commission, above n 151 
197 Ibid. 
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for the past fifteen years as an increasingly attractive concept that can act as an important 
consideration when determining the reasonableness of a decision ; however it has not been 
officially adopted as a separate head ofreview as yet. 198 Therefore the situation in both 
New Zealand and England is unce11ain , and although this area of law has progressed it is 
still a developing area of law. The purpose of this section of the paper is not to resolve 
this uncertainty but merely to outline how much the law has adapted from the stJict 
Wednesbury approach adopted by Goddard J. Whether propo11ionality has a role as a 
separate head of review is not the focus of this paper and furthermore because Section 5 
of the NZBORA requires a prop011ionality analysis which has been unde11aken in this 
paper under the illegality head of review, it is arguable whether a separate proportionality 
head of review is necessa1y. 
6 Goddard Js Approach 
With the developments in the law set out it is now approp1iate to fu11her analyse 
Goddard Js approach to this head ofreview. Goddard Js approach to unreasonableness in 
Goulden199 is an inadequate analysis of the situation in ew Zealand , and it did not take 
into account that when human rights have been impinged upon a more intense scrutiny of 
the decision is required by the com1s. Her Honour adopts the outdated, arguably 
overruled strict Wednesbury approach without any justification for her decision. Goddard 
J was heavily influenced by the fact that the decision maker in this case was a local 
council who are a democratically elected body and therefore she believed it was 
necessary to be highly deferential and respect their decision making ability.200 This is line 
with Wellington WCC v Woolworths No2201 and Waitakere City Council v Lovelock,202 
two judicial review cases where the council ' s rates policies were being disputed. Both 
courts held that in areas such as rates which an area that councils have the highest level of 
198See Waitakere City Council v Lovelock, above n 40; Wolf v Minister of Immigration, above n 151 ; 
Refi,gee Council of New Zealand v Attorney-General (No 1) [2002] NZAR 717; Thompson v Trea ty of 
Waitang i Fisheries Commission [2005] 2 NZLR 9. 
199 Goulden v Wellington City Council, above n 1. 
200 Cane, above n 163 , 252 . 
20 1 Wellington City Council v Woolworths Ne11 · Zealand Ltd (No 2), above n 95. 
202 Waitakere City Council v Lovelock, above n 40. 
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expertise the comts will be highly deferential.203 These cases are not strong authorities to 
support Goddard Js application of strict Wednesbmy unreasonableness in Goulden204 
however because they apply only to there specific fact situations and the court in 
Lovelock205 observed that cases in which civil and political rights are infringed a court 
can more intensely scrutinise a council's decision. 206 Furthennore in Sanders v 
Kingston207 which was affirmed in Livingstone v The Adjudication Panel for England,208 
Wilkie J held that political expression, because of its fundamental importance for the 
maintenance of a democratic society, is afforded an extremely high level of protection.209 
This case involved a Councillor who was sanctioned using the local authority's code of 
conduct because of offensive comments he had made about the numerous deaths of 
soldiers in local anny camps. Wilkie J stated that while the Councillor was not entitled to 
this high level of protection of his rights in this paiticular case, he did recognise that 
where codes of conduct are used against a councillor who did give expression to political 
opinion of an offensive nature, then there might be circumstances in which local 
authorities could not find a breach of the code of conduct without unlawfully infringing 
on the rights protected in Article I O (freedom of expression provision.)2 10 
The outcome in Goulden211 would inevitably have been affected if Goddard J had 
adopted any of the more appropriate approaches outlined above. Regardless of what 
standard of review was applied, a more careful consideration ofGoulden's right to 
freedom of expression would have occurTed and the decision would have been more 
likely to have been struck down for being unreasonable or a disproportionate response. 
IV CONCLUSION 
203 Ibid, 395-397 . 
204 Goulden v We11ington City Council, above n 1. 
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This paper has outlined the role the ZBORA plays in judicial review 
proceedings. In outlining the developments that have occmTed under the illegality and 
unreasonableness heads ofreview the inadequate approach adopted by Goddard J can be 
further understood. Goddard Js treatment of the NZBORA in Goulden212 has been 
contrasted throughout the paper with the appropriate treatment of the NZBORA. If the 
NZBORA and Drew213 had been applied under the illegality head of review then 
Goulden's censure would have been struck down under this head. It is likely that 
Goulden's censure would also have been struck down under the unreasonableness or 
propo11ionality head of review. After evaluating the effect of the NZBORA on judicial 
review it is evident that had the NZBORA been applied properly in Goulden,2 14 the 
outcome would have been entirely different. 
2 12 Ibid 
213 Drew v Attorney General, above n 55. 
2 14 Goulden v Wellington City Council, above n 1. 
33 
CASES 
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbwy COip [1948] l KB 223. 
A,X,Yv Secretaty of State for the Home Department [2003] HRLR 3, (CA) 
Brind v Secretary of State/or the Home department [1991] l All ER 720 (HL) 
Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister/or the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 (HL) 
Drew v Attorney General [2002] l NZLR 58 (CA) 
Goulden v Wellington City Council [2006] 3 NZLR 244 
Kingsley v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR. 
Lange vAtkinson [1998] 3 NZLR424 (CA) 
Lange v Atkinson [2000] 3 NZLR 385 (CA) 
Livingstone v The Adjudication panel for England [2006] EWHC 2533 (admin) 
Minister of Transport v Noort [ 1992] 3 NZLR 260 (CA) 
Multani v Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeyo [2006] l SCR 256. 
Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9 (CA) 
Mercwy Energy Ltd v Electricity Co1p of NZ Ltd [1994] 2 ZLR 385 (PC) 
New York Times v Sullivan 376 US 254 (1964) 
Nottinghamshire County Council v Secreta,y of State for the Environment [1986] AC 
240 
Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v Roussel Uclaf Australia Pty Ltd [1998] 
NZAR 58 (CA) 
Powerco Ltd v Commerce Commission (9 June 2006) HC WN CIV-2005-485-1066 
Progressive Ente,prises Ltd v North Shore City Council [2006] ZRMA 72 (HC) 
R(Alconbwy Ltd) v Secreta,y of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions 
[2001] 2 WLR 1389 (HL) 
R(Daly) vSecreta,y of State for the Home Department [2001] 2 AC 532 (HL) 
34 
R v Minist1y of Defence exp. v Smith [ 1995] 4 All ER 427 
R v BBC, ex parte Profile Alliance [2003]UKHL 23 (HL) 
R v Cornwall CC, exp. Cornwall and Isles of Scilly Guardians ad Litem and reporting 
Officers Panel [ 1992] 2 ALL ER 4 71 
R v Hansen [2007] NZSC SC 58/2005 7 
R v Oakes [1986] l SCR 103 
R v Saville Inqui,y exp. A and others [ 1999] EWHC Admin 556, 
Ransfield v The Radio Network Ltd. [2005] l NZLR 233 (HC) 
R v Central Television Pie [1994] 3 All E.R 641 
R v Zundel [1992] 2 SCR 731 
Refugee Council of New Zealand v Attorney-General (No I) [2002] NZAR 717; 
Sanders v Kingston 76-78, 85 [2005] EWHC 1145 (Admin) 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehan [2001] UKHL 47, {HL) 
Smith and Grady v United Kingdom (2000) 29 EHRR 493; 
Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979) 2 EHRR 245 
Solicitor .General v Radio New Zealand Ltd [1994] l NZLR 48 
Thompson v Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission [2005] 2 NZLR 9 
Thames Valley Electric Power Board v NZ Forest Products Pulp & Paper Ltd [ 1994] 2 
NZLR 641 
Wellington City Council v Woolworths New Zealand Ltd (No 2) [ 1996] 2 NZLR 537 
Wolf v Minister of Immigration [2004] NZAR 414 (HC); 
Waitakere City Council v Lovelock [ 1997] 2 NZLR 385 (CA) 
West Glamorgan CC v Rafferty [ 1987] l WLR 457. 
Weeks v United Kingdom (1987) 10 EHRR 293; 
35 
LEGISLATION 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
Local Government Act 2002 
Defamation Act 197 
Official lnfom1ation Act 1982 
Human Right Act 1998 (UK) 
Interpretation Act 1999 
Regulations Act 1936 
TEXTS 
Butler Andrew and Petra Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act; a commenta,y 
(LexisNexis, Wellington, 2005) 
Cane, Peter, Administrative Law, (4 ed, Oxford University Press, 2004) 
Joseph, Philip A., Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2 ed, 
Brookers, Wellington, 2001) 
Rishworth, Paul, The New Zealand Biff of Rights (Oxford University Press, Auckland , 
2003) 
ARTICLES 
Hickman, Tom Propo11ionality: "Comparative Law Lessons" [2007] JR, 33 
Le Sueur, Andrew "The Rise and Ruin ofUnreasonableness? "[2005] JR 32 
Rishwo11h Paul "Human Rights" [200 I] NZ L Rev 
Rishwo11h Paul "Human Rights" [2003] NZ L Rev 
Taggart Michael "Administrative Law" [2006] Z L Rev 75 
Tagga11 Michael "Administrative Law" [2003] NZ L Rev 99 
36 
Varuhas, Jason "Powerco v Commerce Commission: Developing Trends of 
Proportionality in New Zealand Administrative Law," (2006) 4 NZJPIL 339 
GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS 
Office of Controller and Auditor General, Local Authority Codes of Conduct, (2006) 
Office of Controller and Auditor General, Managing the relationship between a local 
authorities Elected Members and its Chief Executive, (2002) 
Depm1ment of Internal Affairs, 2001. Review of Local Government Act 1974; Synopsis of 
submissions. 
Goulden v Wellington City Council CASE DOCUMENTS 
"Rob Goulden for Mayor and Council"(20 September 2004) Cook Strait News 
Deputy Mayor Alick Shaws letter to Mayor Keny Prendergast (30 September 2004) 
Chronology prepared by counsel for applicant and counsel for respondent. 
Submissions of Counsel for Applicant CN 2005/485/001 
Submissions of Counsel for Respondent CN 2005/485/001 
Transc1ipt of the Wellington City Council Extraordinruy Meeting (15 December 2004) 
Affidavit Basil James MoITison (10 March 2005) CN 2005-485-00 l 
UNPUBLISHED RESEARCH PAPERS 
Leyland, Tim The Design and Implementation of Codes of Conduct in New Zealand 
Local Government 2003-2004 (MMPM Research paper, Victoria University of 
Wellington, 2005) 
Sheppru·d, John "Codes of Conduct- Ongoing Education" in Conference Papers -
LexisNexis Professional Development 3rd Annual Local Government Legal Forum 2004. 
Varuhas, Jason, Keeping things in proportion: Thejudicia,y, executive action and human 
rights (LLB(Hons) Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 2003) 
37 
MICELLANEOUS 
Wellington City Council Code of Conduct 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
(European) Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(1950) 
INTERNET 
Brookers Online Commentary 
http://www.brookersonline.co.nz.helicon.vuw.ac.nz/databases/modus/ lawpai1/statutes/AC 
T-NZL-PUB-
Y.200284---END- SCHG- SCH. 7- PT.1 - CLG. !22 l - CL. l5?sid=uk l 11xsrvjncxl ch5xephan 
072ml4wc4&hli=4&sp=statutes&si=57359(1ast accessed 28 August 2007) 
Oxford Dictionary Online, 
http://dictionaiy.oed .com.helicon.vuw.ac.nz/cgi/entry/50035538?query_ type=word&quer 
yword=censure&first= I &max _ to_ show= 1 O&so11_ type=alpha&result_place= 1 &search_ i 
d=EVPw-16yYHy-737l&hilite=50035538(last accessed July 21 2007) 
38 

VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON LIBRARY 
lllllll lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll llllllllll lllll lllllllllllllll l/11111  
3 7212 01717367 3 
